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Connaught Battery and the Defence
of the Atlantic Coast, 1906-1941
Roger Sarty and Bruce Ellis

Editor’s note: A sequel to this feature will appear in an upcoming issue of Canadian Military
History and will explore the legacy of Connaught Battery and its condition today.

Status of Halifax Harbour
Defence in 1906

C

onnaught Battery, on the shores
of Halifax harbour, has virtually
been ignored by historians despite its
prominence during a pivotal period
in Canadian maritime defence. 1
After taking over the fortiﬁcations
of Halifax from the British army in
1905-6, when the Imperial armed
forces withdrew from the Canadian
coasts, the Dominion government
built the battery from 1913 to 1916 as
part of a larger programme to bring
the fortress up to date. The battery’s
story bridges the transformation of the
fortress from a British bastion against
the United States to a Canadian
strongpoint that guarded the North
Atlantic shipping lanes upon which
Britain’s survival depended during
the two world wars.2
A thorough modernization of
the Halifax fortress had been nearly
completed when the Imperial troops
departed, but this happened at a
time when coast defence practice
was changing rapidly. Sandwich
Battery and Fort McNab, whose
heavy, long-range guns commanded
the outer harbour, were well placed
for another full generation of useful
service, but the same was not true of
the defences close-in to the city. These
included electrically controlled antiship mines that in the event of war
were to be laid in Eastern Passage, the

channel between Ives Point and Point
Pleasant and the mouth of the North
West Arm. To prevent the enemy
from destroying or running through
the minefields, a form of attack
that was likely to come at night,
there were electric searchlights and
seven batteries of medium and light
quick-ﬁring guns at Point Pleasant,
Georges Island and Ives Point, and
at Fort Clarence on the Dartmouth
shore. The Royal Navy, however,
had never trusted the army’s harbour
mines, and in 1904-6 succeeded in
having them abolished. That left
inner defence exclusively to shore
batteries at a time when the speed
and intensity of Japanese destroyer
and blockship attacks on Port Arthur
during the Russo-Japanese War
suggested that quick-ﬁring armament
should be moved towards the mouths
of harbours to stop such strikes before
they reached anchored shipping or
port facilities.3

Hesitant Steps before the
First World War

T

he ofﬁcers of the new Canadian
garrison immediately took up
the problem. By the fall of 1909 the
staff at Halifax, with assistance from
British army and naval ofﬁcers, had
concluded that three 4.7-inch quickﬁre (QF) guns from Georges Island
and searchlights from Fort Clarence
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should be moved to a new battery near
Falkland Village, south of Purcells
Cove. Two other new batteries, at
York Redoubt and on McNabs Island,
would receive the guns from Fort
Clarence and two of the forts at Point
Pleasant. 4 The scheme was tested
with encouraging results during 1910
when the Fort Clarence searchlights
were operated from temporary
emplacements at Falkland. These
“dispersed beam” lights projected
a broad fan of illumination to a
range of 1,200 to 1,500 yards. In
conjunction with similar lights at
Ives Point, they created a brightly
lit corridor over the shipping lane
from York Redoubt back through the
Ives Point–Point Pleasant channel, a
distance of some two miles. Thus,
if a sufﬁcient number of guns were
properly placed, they would have
a good chance of smashing even a
determined night attack.5
Finding money to carry out
the program was the problem. In
maintaining the fortress with a
garrison of over 1,000 regular troops,
the militia department had already
stretched its resources at a time
when the unexpectedly high cost
to the federal government of new
transcontinental railways brought
restrictions on defence spending. The
department ﬁnally expropriated the
Falkland site in the spring of 1912, but
funds for construction there were not
provided until a year later, and then
57
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Dumping granite ﬁll on the harbourward face of Connaught Battery from the light
rail system that assisted construction. This photo was likely taken in early 1916.
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held off only with an enormous effort
on land and at sea. Quite aside from
that, the British Empire had been
pursuing a policy of reconciliation
with the United States. The real and
growing danger was of hit-and-run
raids by German cruisers to disrupt
North Atlantic shipping, and against
this form of attack the existing gun
armament at Halifax was more
than adequate, although, in some
cases, poorly placed.8 Gwatkin won
agreement that as many as ﬁve of
the inner forts should be abandoned,
and that none of the planned new
batteries except Falkland should
proceed. Undoubtedly the money
already spent inﬂuenced the decision
to continue the work at Falkland, but
defences on the western approaches
to the inner harbour were urgently
required even if the steep hills there
made less than ideal sites for quickﬁring artillery; these guns were most
effective in sweeping the surface of
the water from low positions.9

Despite the renewed commitment
to build the Falkland battery, work
ground to a halt in the spring of 1914.
The government had ﬁnally voted
$70,000 for the Halifax defences in
ﬁscal year 1914-15, but these limited
funds were needed to purchase
modern searchlight equipment from
Great Britain.10

Work

The First World War

T

he outbreak of war between the
British Empire and Germany on 4
August 1914 quickly translated plans
into action. On 22 August, Militia
headquarters telegraphed authority
to Halifax for the expenditure of
$46,000 on fortiﬁcation construction,
including $25,000 for Falkland
battery.11 The governor-general, the
Duke of Connaught, was closely
watching developments at Halifax.
He deeply mistrusted Colonel Sam
Hughes, the Minister of Militia,
and was especially critical of the

CFJIC RE 84-179

only $24,000 as against the $75,000
estimated to be the total cost of the
fort. By early 1914 most of the money
had been consumed in excavating the
solid granite site.6
The staffs in Halifax and Ottawa
then reconsidered the fortress
reorganization plan. Over the
years of discussion it had become
more elaborate, the projected cost
of the whole programme rising
from $167,500 to $200,000.7 Colonel
(later Major-General Sir) Willoughby
Gwatkin, a British ofﬁcer on loan to
the Canadian Militia who had become
Chief of the General Staff in October
1913, took the lead in scaling down
the plan in light of funds and troops
actually available. He was probably
also influenced by candid advice
sent to the Canadian government
by the British Admiralty that the
large-scale American attacks that had
always governed the strength of the
Halifax defences could no longer be
contemplated because the expanding
United States military could now be
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Workmen mount a 4.7-inch Quick-Fire gun at
Connaught Battery in early 1916.
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Above: A workman carries timbers along the construction trolleyway in front of one of the 4.7-inch guns.
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Below: A view from Connaught Battery looking out over Halifax Harbour.
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This air photo, taken in June 1944, shows Connaught Battery from the rear of the position.
Note the anti-submarine nets in the top right corner of the photograph. By the Second World
War the original guns had been replaced with dummy guns meant to deceive the enemy.

latter’s failure to give the fortress a
higher priority before the outbreak
of war. Rear Admiral R.S. Phipps
Hornby, Commander-in-Chief of the
Royal Navy’s North America and
West Indies Station, was also very
concerned about the situation. When
in mid-September Gwatkin began
to reduce the garrison mobilized
at Halifax in response to the Royal
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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Navy’s success in securing the North
Atlantic shipping lanes, Hornby
had the Admiralty make a strong
protest to the Canadian government:
“…Halifax is an essential base for
British cruisers protecting trade to
and from Canada and the reduction
ordered effects the safety of the base
considerably.” Although Gwatkin
cancelled the troop withdrawals, the

Duke of Connaught asked Hornby
to make a special report on Halifax.
The Admiral, who feared a desperate
rush by German warships on the
port, particularly if the war began
to go badly for the Central Powers,
urged that Falkland battery should
be rapidly completed.12
The Falkland position had not
been chosen with ease of construction
61
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Connaught Battery showing two of the three 4.7-inch Quick-Fire guns in the summer of 1916.

in mind. Water transportation was
the only practicable form of access,
necessitating the construction of a
pier at a cost of at least $10,000, and
the erection of a cable car on large
wooden towers to lift heavy loads to
the top of the 160-foot hill at a further
cost of over $3,000. Materials were
moved over the rugged ground of the
site in carts on a light rail system.13
Although these arrangements were
not completed until June 1915, there
had been considerable progress in
the construction of the battery by that
time. The massive concrete platforms
to which the gun mountings were
to be bolted had been poured, and
equipment was already being installed
in the buildings for the searchlights.
To save time, only the foundation of
the electrical generating station (the
“engine room”), and the structure of
the associated oil storage building
were built in concrete; both can still
be seen in the clearing immediately
to the north of the main battery site.
The rest of the work, including the
searchlight emplacement on the
foreshore below the hill, was in wood.
One 10 September 1915, a detachment
of approximately 50 engineer troops
began to operate the three lights
at Falkland. 14 Two months later,
the governor-general showed his
continued interest in the fort by
62
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allowing it to be named Connaught
Battery.15

Henry Eugene McKeen and
Connaught Battery

I

n peacetime a large project such
as the construction of Connaught
Battery would be overseen by the
most senior Royal Canadian Engineer
officer in the Maritime provinces.
The immense volume of wartime
work, however, meant the job fell to a
junior ofﬁcer. Henry Eugene McKeen,
of Woodstock, New Brunswick, was
a 24-year-old provisional lieutenant
in the 1st (Brighton) Field Company,
Canadian Engineers, a unit of the parttime militia, when he came to Halifax
late in 1914 for active service with
the Royal Canadian Engineers of the
Permanent Force. Although McKeen
had had little military training or
experience, he was a practicing civil
engineer, having graduated from
the University of New Brunswick in
1910. As Divisional Ofﬁcer 3, he was
in charge of construction services
for the seaward defences and was
responsible for 500 civilian workers.
Connaught Battery was merely the
biggest of the several projects under
his supersivion.16

McKeen faced an enormous task
in completing the gun positions.
The design, probably adapted from
standard British drawings, combined
the three emplacements, with their
associated magazines and crew
shelters, into a large reinforced
concrete structure 90 yards long and
20 yards wide. The entire position
had to be excavated in granite; once
the concrete work was complete, the
seaward face was covered with 17,000
cubic yards of broken stone and
the slope of the hill was contoured
to better protect the site. Further
excavations were made to the rear of
the gun positions to create a sheltered
site for the artillery detachment’s
wooden barracks.17
Wartime conditions created
special problems. Congestion on
the railways, and the navy’s closure
of the port during periodic alarms
whenever the possibility of an attack
was conceived delayed shipments
from distant suppliers and, in the
latter case, held up the transportation
of material and shifts of workers
from the Halifax waterfront to the
battery. Some crucial materials were
simply not available. Sand was in
such short supply that workers had
to scrape up the thin topsoil from
surrounding areas to provide ﬁll for
the protective slope in front of the
6
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battery. During the winter of 1915-16
construction continued around the
clock, but the severe weather caused
a high rate of absenteeism among the
200 labourers who normally worked
at the site. The military was not
pleased with the quality of the work
force. “Owing to the enlistment of
the better class of English-speaking

labourers,” complained MajorGeneral Thomas Benson, General
Ofﬁcer Commanding in the Maritime
Provinces, “it has been necessary to
employ foreign labour to a larger
extent than is desirable, as they can
only be used to the best advantage
at digging, mucking, etc, and owing
to their numerous holidays.” The 80

Russians employed on the project, for
example, disappeared for three days
in January 1916 to celebrate the old
and new style Russian Christmas.18
These frustrations told heavily
on McKeen. By the spring of 1916,
he was on the edge of physical
and nervous collapse, so much
so that he was given two months
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Another aerial view of Connaught battery, taken in June 1944, looking over Purcells Cove and into the
Northwest Arm. Halifax is on the right of the Arm. The barracks, engine room and other support facilities for
the searchlights are immediately north (above) the main battery.
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A military band leads a procession of troops to garrison Connaught Battery. The wooden tower (right)
was part of the cable system used to lift loads up to the battery from the pier on the shore.
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the censure and instead commended
McKeen’s work. He was justiﬁed in
doing so, as wartime inﬂation and the
heavy expense of winter construction
had similarly escalated the costs of
other projects in Halifax.19

Connaught Battery Becomes
Operational

D

uring the clash over the
ledgerbooks, the battery was
being readied for operations. The
components of the guns – three 4.7inch QF, two of which had originally
been mounted in Fort Clarence,
and one in Fort Charlotte – were
delivered to the site in January 1916.
These weapons fired a 45-pound
projectile at a rate of 12 rounds

per minute to an effective range
of about 8,000 yards. The 70-man
artillery garrison was provided by
the 1st (Halifax) Regiment, Canadian
Garrison Artillery, a militia unit,
began to arrive in February. Test
rounds were fired from the guns
early in August, and later that month
the Duke of Connaught attended a
ceremony that ofﬁcially opened the
battery.20 McKeen was ﬁnally posted
overseas in September, and served in
Belgium and France in 1918 before
returning to Canada and becoming
the ﬁrst postwar commanding ofﬁcer
of the 1st (Brighton) Field Company,
CE, his old militia unit.21
As things turned out, Connaught
Battery had been ﬁnished in good
time. Early in 1915 the Admiralty had
warned the Canadian government

CFJIC RE 84-180

medical leave. Showing a certain
bureaucratic naivete, McKeen had
concentrated his waning energy on
supervising work at the site and had
failed to keep the ﬁnancial records
up to date. When in May he was
offered a posting to an overseas unit,
Major-General Benson had to cancel
the appointment as McKeen was
required in Halifax to verify the large
number of unaccounted bills that were
ﬂowing into fortress headquarters.
Soon after, a letter arrived from
Militia headquarters which reported
the Duke of Connaught’s impatience
with the slow construction, and
strongly criticized the delays and
soaring costs. Since 1913 nearly
$250,000 had been spent, over three
times the highest prewar estimate.
Happy to say, Benson ﬁrmly rejected
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about the possibility of German
submarines crossing the Atlantic, but
the threat took on a new dimension
when U-53 sank five Allied ships
off Massachusetts in October of the
following year. The Germans were
indeed preparing large submarines
with an armament of 15 cm guns
as well as torpedoes and mines for
distant operations. The Admiralty
feared that U-boats might run into
Halifax on the surface at night, and
therefore the searchlight and quickﬁre gun batteries were of increased
importance because neither the small
Canadian patrol vessels available nor
the Royal Navy’s cruisers on station
could effectively deal with the “super
submarines.” Connaught inherited
further responsibilities when in
the summer of 1917 the Canadian
navy installed an anti-submarine
net between Point Pleasant and Ives
Point. Shore batteries were essential
to defeat enemy attempts to break
throught this barrier. Another danger
was that powerful enemy surface
warships might break out of the North

Sea under the cover of foul weather
and strike at overseas bases before
British squadrons could respond. The
reality of the German threat became
clear in August-September 1918
when three large U-boats inﬂicted
substantial losses on shipping in
Nova Scotia’s coastal waters, and
laid mines – which fortunately did no
damage – in the Halifax approaches.
Connaught, like the other Halifax
forts, was maintained at a high state
of readiness until the armistice on
11 November 1918. The manning
detachment was withdrawn on 24
December, leaving only a small
caretaking detail.22

The Interwar Years

D

uring the interwar years, 19191939, the fortress became a
backwater. Governments bent on
costcutting slashed defence spending,
and Militia headquarters gave mobile
ﬁeld units priority over the garrisons
on the coasts. Connaught Batttery

did, however, attract a large share
of the limited funds available for
fortiﬁcation construction. In 1924-25,
the wooden searchlight emplacements
on the shore and the temporary
battery command post immediately
to the north of the gun emplacements
were replaced by concrete buildings.
The searchlights were run regularly
for maintenance and training, but
the guns were very seldom ﬁred as
4.7-inch ammunition was in short
supply, and the battery was too near
to the city and the main shipping
channel for safe shooting.23

Connaught Battery
De-Activated

T

he battery’s service as an
operational coast fort was in fact
drawing to a close. In 1931 MajorGeneral A.G.L. McNaughton, chief of
the General Staff, ﬁnally laid to rest
the traditional premise of Canadian
home defence that preparations could
be made to meet an invasion from the

Workman excavate solid granite to make way for the Connaught Battery barracks.
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United States. He immediately applied
the new policy at Halifax, where three
forts, including Connaught, were
struck from the defence scheme. In
1932 the ammunition was removed
from the magazines, and the guns
were designated reserve armament
available for other ports in the
Maritimes. The fate of the battery
was sealed in the mid-1930s when
the navy decided that in a future
war the fortress’ antisubmarine net
would be installed between York
Redoubt and Maugher’s Beach. New
quick-ﬁring batteries would have to
be built ahead of this line. In 1938,
when preparations began to defend
the Maritimes in the event of a war
in Europe, the battery’s guns were
removed.24
Connaught Battery nevertheless
played a significant role in the
defence of Halifax during the
Second World War. Because of
delays in the provision of modern
searchlights, the battery’s lights were
fully manned and operational from
26 August 1939 until the spring of
1941. In the meantime, the main part
of the fort was used as temporary
accommodation for artillery units.
Late in 1941 the whole site became the
camp for 2nd Fortress (Electrical and
Mechanical) Company, RCE, which
was responsible for construction
and works maintenance services in
the fortress. For a few years after
the war, buildings at the battery
were used as quarters for married
military personnel. All of the wooden
barracks were declared surplus and
dismantled in 1952-53.25 Thereafter
scrapmetal scroungers stripped
the fortiﬁcations of all steel ﬁttings
and did a good deal of damage.
Residents of the surrounding areas
also covered the site with dozens of
car wrecks. In 1971 the provincial
government purchased the fort from
Crown Assets 26 and removed the
“automotive decorations.”

66
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss2/6

Sarty and Ellis - Connaught Battery.indd 66

Conclusion
10.

C

onnaught Battery is well worth
preserving. Its design is unique
among the coast artillery sites that
survive in Canada. It is the only site
which features such extensive concrete
works within a single structure.
It was also the most important
permanent fortiﬁcation undertaken
by the Dominion government prior
to the late 1930s, representing, like
the founding of the Royal Canadian
Navy in 1910, Canada’s assumption
of the responsibility for the defence
of its own shores.
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